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Income-expenditure surveys typically provide incomes on the household level. As households can 
differ in size and needs, a reliable assessment of inequality in living standards, therefore, 
necessitates the conversion of the original heterogeneous into an artificial quasi-homogeneous 
population. Ebert and Moyes (2003) and Shorrocks (2004) theoretically explore the properties of 
two alternative conversion strategies: a weighting of household equivalent incomes by size and by 
needs. We use data from the Luxembourg Income Study for examining the sensitivity of the Gini 
and the Theil index to the chosen conversion strategy, and explain our results by means of an 
inequality decomposition by population subgroups. 
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Researchers and the public are eager to know about the distribution of living standards across 
individuals in a society. The living standard is determined by the material comfort goods and 
services available to each person provide. Usually, ‘household income’ serves as a proxy for the 
level of material comfort. Yet, this proxy is biased when comparisons involve household types that 
are heterogeneous. The concept of equivalent incomes masters this problem. Equivalent incomes 
are incomes that equalize the level of material comfort of persons living in different household 
types. Dividing the income of a household by the equivalent income of the one-member household 
gives the (relative) equivalence scale of the former household. Accordingly, an equivalence scale 
quantifies household needs relative to an ‘equivalent (single) adult.’  
Based on household-level income data, the one-member-household equivalent income can 
be assigned to each household member and all individuals of an economy can be viewed as living 
in separate one-member households. The consequent artificial quasi-homogeneous distribution of 
one-member-households’ equivalent incomes captures the inequality of living standards among 
individuals. Still, even if one imposes income independent equivalence scales, such a conversion is 
not innocuous from a normative perspective (cf. Ebert and Moyes (2003) and Shorrocks (2004)). 
Especially, it does not meet the condition that an income transfer, which reduces the difference in 
living standards of two households, must not increase inequality (cf. Ebert and Moyes (2003)). To 
meet this condition, Ebert and Moyes (2003) suggest an alternative conversion procedure; i.e., to 
weight the equivalent income of any household unit by a factor that is equal (proportional) to its 
equivalence scale. The outcome is a quasi-homogeneous distribution that depicts inequality of 
livings standards among equivalent adults. 
 In this article, we contrast inequality estimates derived from size- and needs-weighted 
distributions. Inequality is measured by means of the Theil and the Gini index, both being among 
the most popular inequality measures in applied research. Estimates are provided for an extensive 
set of countries, also varying equivalence scales. Theil and Gini indices turn out to be sensitive to 
the chosen conversion procedure, and differences in the estimates are sufficiently large to change 
country inequality rankings – including reasonable levels of household-size economies. An 
inequality decomposition by household types reveals that this is due to an empirical regularity: 
compared to smaller household units, equivalent incomes of larger units tend to be distributed more 
equally. 
 Here is a roadmap to our paper. In Section 2, we suggest a useful benchmark scenario for 




underlying our empirical analysis. In Section 3, we briefly explain our database and present our 
empirical results. Section 4 concludes the paper.   
 
2 Preliminary considerations 
2.1 A useful benchmark 
To account for the dependence of peoples’ living standards on household size and composition, 
household incomes are converted into equivalent incomes. Equivalence scales serve as the 
conversion device. Taking the one-member household as the reference, an equivalence scale gives 
the percentage change in household income required to maintain the living standard of each 
household member as further members are added. If household-size economies are achieved, the 
percentage change in household income which holds the living standard of a household’s members 
constant is less than the percentage increase in family size. In practice there is no consensus about 
what the ‘correct’ equivalence scale is. For this reason, we apply a parametric equivalence scale 
suggested in Buhmann et al. (1988) that is rather flexible and allows for the variation of household-
size economies through a single parameter. According to Buhmann et al. (1988), an equivalence 
scale can be written as ( )θii hES = , where ni ,...,1=  denotes the household type and ih  is its number 
of members. Household-size economies are represented by the catch-all parameter θ , with 
10 ≤≤ θ , the ‘equivalence-scale elasticity.’  
From this specification it follows that ( )θκκ iii hxy ,, =  is the one-member household’s 
equivalent income of a household κ  of type i  with household income ix ,κ . A distribution of one-
member-households’ equivalent incomes (DOMHEI) is derived from the original household-
income distribution by calculating, for each household unit, one-member household equivalent 
income and assigning this number to each household member. Consequently, we use the acronym 
‘size-weighting’ to describe the conversion of the heterogeneous population into the DOMHEI. 
Compared with this, the conversion strategy of Ebert and Moyes (2003) requires that the equivalent 
income of any household unit is assigned to the number of equivalent adults living in the same 
household (alias the household’s equivalence scale). The outcome is a ‘distribution of equivalent 
adult households’ equivalent incomes’ (DEAHEI), and we refer to this type of conversion as 
‘needs-weighting.’1  
Two special cases can be considered. First, the within-household production technology is 
such that full household-size economies are achieved ( 0=θ ). Then household income equals 
                                                          
1 Albeit its appealing properties from a normative perspective, the information content of such a distribution is open to 




equivalent income, and ‘ h  household members live as cheap as one.’ In this scenario, the 
equivalence scale is the same for all household types. Therefore, needs-weighting implies that all 
household incomes are weighted by the same factor, whereas, in case of size-weighting, household 
income is assigned to each household member. Second, the within-household production 
technology is such that household-size economies achieved are zero ( 1=θ ), and ‘ h  household 
members live as cheap as h .’ In this case, the DOMHEI and the DEAHEI are equivalent concepts. 
Hence, this scenario may be seen as an eligible benchmark for investigating how DOMHEI- and 
DEAHEI-based inequality estimates differ when household-size economies go up.   
 
2.2 Implications for inequality 
Let iΚ denote the number of households belonging to type i .  Then, the number of artificial one-






. Again, we focus on household unit 









,κ  is the population share of all artificial one-
member households formerly belonging to household unit κ , and DOMHEIip ,κ is the population share 
of κ  in the DOMHEI. The equivalent-income share of all artificial one-member households derived 









,, µπ κκ ; with iµ  
being the mean equivalent income of all households of type i . Compared to this, needs-weighting 






 is the total number of 









,κ  is the population share of κ  in the 










,, µπ κκ .  
These differences have immediate implications for inequality estimates elicited from the 
two quasi-homogeneous populations. For example, think of a heterogeneous population with many 
equally rich one-member households (in terms of equivalent income), and one poor multi-member 
household. Then the DEAHEI Lorenz dominates the DOMHEI, and size-weighted relative 
inequality estimates would indicate more inequality than needs-weighted estimates. Yet, the 
conversion procedure (and also the level of θ ) does not affect the degree of relative inequality 
                                                                                                                                                                                                




among incomes of a quasi-homogeneous subgroup originating from the same household type. The 
ratios of population shares and equivalent-incomes of any such two households always equal 
1,2,1,2,1 == DEAHEIiDEAHEIiDOMHEIiDOMHEIi pppp  and 1, 2, 1, 2,i i i iy y x x constant= = . Hence, for this 
subgroup, a scale invariant, relative inequality index is not affected by the chosen conversion 
strategy. Yet, what will typically change is inequality between subgroups. An inequality 
decomposition by household types may, therefore, help in determining the effects that the two 
conversion strategies have on inequality.  
 
2.3 Decomposing inequality by subgroups 
Decomposability of an inequality measure implies a coherent relationship between inequality in the 
whole population and inequality in its constituent mutually exclusive subgroups. The basic idea is 
to express overall inequality as a function of inequality within and between its subgroups. An index 
is additively decomposable if it can be written as a weighted sum of the within-subgroup inequality 
indices plus a between-subgroup inequality term based on mean incomes and subgroup sizes. 
Obviously, it is quite exceptionable that an inequality index possesses such properties, but the Theil 
coefficient is a pleasant example. Other measures including the Gini coefficient are only 
decomposable, and a residual term remains.  
Identifying subgroups of quasi-homogeneous households originating from equally typed 
households is the basic idea underlying our empirical analysis. This identification enables us to 
quantify how features of household-type specific income distributions affect inequality in living 
standards among artificial homogeneous units. Suppressing the DOMHEI/DEAHEI superscript, a 
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⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟Κ ⎝ ⎠∑   
is the Theil index of the subgroup constructed from household type i .2 The within-subgroup 
component of equation (1) is the sum of the subgroup specific Theil indices (equation (2)), whereby 
each iT  is weighted by the population share ip  times µµ i . The latter expression captures how far 
type- i ’s deviates from overall mean equivalent income. Inequality between subgroups is measured 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
equivalent income.” 




by the second term on the right hand side of (1), and is determined by the weighted sum of relative 
deviations of subgroup specific from overall mean equivalent income.  
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where iG  is the Gini index of the subgroup originating from type- i  households,
3 iπ  is the 
equivalent income share of i  in total equivalent income (‘economic weight’), and O  is the ‘overlap 
term.’ Correspondingly to the Theil decomposition, within-group inequality, as captured by the first 
term of equation (3), is represented by the weighted sum of subgroup specific Gini coefficients. 
Between-subgroup inequality is given by the sum of relative differences in mean equivalent 
incomes of any two subgroups, i  and j , weighted by ji pπ , whereby subgroups are ranked by 
mean equivalent income such that ij µµ > . Abstracting from ji pπ , addends are the larger the bigger 
the relative difference in two subgroups’ mean equivalent incomes is, viz. comparing ‘rich’ and 
‘poor’ subgroups. Finally, the third term of (3) measures the overlap of subgroups’ equivalent 
income distributions: ceteris paribus, the overlap is the higher the closer together the subgroup 
means of equivalent incomes are (see Lambert and Aranson (1993), p. 1226).4 
 In (1-3), some elements are invariant to the way the quasi-homogeneous population is 
constructed from the underlying heterogeneous one, namely iµ s, iG s, iT s, and O . Others, listed 







































































 DOMHEIip : fraction of one-member households in the DOMHEI originating from type i  
households;  
 DEAHEIip : fraction of equivalent adults in the DEAHEI originating from type i  households;  
 DOMHEIiπ : equivalent income share in the DOMHEI originating from type i  households;  
                                                          
3 See Pyatt (1976) for details. 
4 For a more detailed discussion on the decomposability of the Gini and the properties of its different components see, 




 DEAHEIiπ : equivalent income share in the DEAHEI originating from type i  households; 
 DOMHEIµ : mean equivalent income per capita in the DOMHEI;  
 DEAHEIµ : mean equivalent income per equivalent adult in the DEAHEI. 
 
3 Sensitivity analysis 
3.1 Data 
Our empirical examination is based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). For 30 
countries and several years, the LIS provides representative micro-level information on private 
households’ incomes and demographic characteristics (i.e., number, age and gender of each family 
member). To keep the empirical analysis tractable, only 20 countries (the US and 19 European 
countries) from a single LIS wave (1999/2000; see the Appendix Table A1 for details) are 
considered.5 Additionally, only data from nine household types are taken into account: one- and 
two-adult households with zero up to three children, and childless three-adult households.6  
Equivalent incomes are based on the LIS variable ‘household disposable income’ (DPI). 
DPI is harmonized across countries, covers labor earnings, property income, and government 
transfers in cash minus income and payroll taxes.7 As DPIs are denoted in local currencies and 
prices, they are transformed into PPP adjusted Dollars. DPIs from year 1999 are also growth-
adjusted and deflated by inter-temporal price indices to the year 2000. All deflators and conversion 
factors are summarized in Table A1. To meet the restrictions on the income domain imposed by 
Ebert and Moyes (2003) and Shorrocks (2004), only households with positive DPIs are considered. 
For each household type and country separately, Table 1a provides the number of observations (not 
weighted),8 the fraction of the country-wide populations living in the same household type 
(weighted), and the average disposable household income per month (weighted, PPP adjusted in 
USD in 2000). In addition, Table 1b summarizes sum further aggregate features of the resulting 
country data bases, including the total number of observations (non-weighted), average household 
income, average household size and the fraction of the country population belonging to the nine 
distinguished household types (column label: ‘coverage’). It turns out that the coverage is 
satisfactory well in all 20 countries we study, never falling below 75 percent. 
 
                                                          
5 Bönke and Schröder (2007) used wave V.1 in an earlier version of this paper.  
6 We use the LIS variables ‘d4’ and ‘d27’ to distinguish adults from children, where ‘d27’ gives the number of 
household members of age below 18 and ‘d4’ denotes the total number of household members. 
7 For the exact DPI definition see Luxembourg Income Study (2006), and for its cross-country comparability 
Burkhauser et al. (1996) and references therein. 
8 We provide the unweighted number of observations to give the reader a clear picture of the actual numbers of 




[Table 1a about here] 
[Table 1b about here] 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics of country-specific quasi-homogeneous distributions 
This section summarizes several features of the country equivalent-income distributions, all of them 
constituting elements of Theil and Gini indices. Figure 1 depicts the ratio DEAHEIi
DOMHEI
i pp along 
the dimension of θ . The figure shows how much size- and needs weighted subgroup population 
shares differ. Estimates referring to the same country are connected by an interpolated line. 
Symbols and formats of lines (dashed vs. solid) distinguish estimates across countries. As the 
Buhman et al. (1988) equivalence scale makes no distinction between adults and children, only the 
number of household members matter. Hence, DEAHEIi
DOMHEI
i pp  estimates coincide for A1C1 and 
A2C0, for A1C2, A2C1 and A3C0, as well as for A1C3 and A2C2. Accordingly, the five graphs in 
Figure 1 convey all the empirical findings.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 




i pp -curves are always downwards sloped. For two-member households (A1C1 and 
A2C0), there is no clear relationship between DEAHEIi
DOMHEI
i pp  and θ : In most countries, the 
relationship is positive, but u-shaped in others. For the one-member household, DEAHEIi
DOMHEI
i pp -
curves are upwards sloped. These patterns can be explained by country demographics. Average 
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The term hES  is smaller than 1.0 if 1<θ  and if there is at least one multi-member household. 
Moreover, hES  is increasing in θ  as 0>∂∂ θiES  for 01CAi ≠ . As 
10101 =CACA ESh , DEAHEICADOMHEICA pp 0101 is strictly monotonically increasing in θ . For multi-member 
households, a θ  variation, per se, has an ambiguous effect on DEAHEIiDOMHEIi pp  as ii ESh   is 
decreasing in θ , thus mitigating the hES  effect. It turns out that hES  is more sensitive to a θ  




i pp  is strictly  decreasing in θ . For subgroups A1C1 and A2C0, ih  is less or almost 




i pp -curve is u-shaped: This especially applies to Norway ( 99.1=h ) and Finland  
( 01.2=h ). 
Observed DEAHEIi
DOMHEI
i pp  relationships have immediate implications for inequality, as can 
be seen from equations (1-3). Consider, for example, the between-subgroup component. Here we 
have that the weights assigned to differences in subgroup-specific mean equivalent incomes are 
contingent upon the type of conversion. But subtle differences even arise concerning the 
classification of ‘rich’ or ‘poor’ subgroups.’ Following equation (1), one can call subgroup i   
 ‘rich’ if 1>DOMHEIi µµ ; respectively if 1>DEAHEIi µµ , 
 ‘poor’ if 1<DOMHEIi µµ ; respectively if 1<DEAHEIi µµ . 
Figure 2 encompasses such ratios in nine separate graphs, containing six lines each. Solid lines are 
estimates of equivalent-income ratios derived from the DOMHEI; dashed lines from the DEAHEI. 
For both types of conversion, three lines are provided. The upper line gives the cross-country 
maximum of the equivalent income ratio, and the lower line the respective minimum. The line in 
between represents the cross-country mean. With the exception of the needs-weighted A2CO 
subgroup, lines referring to subgroups originating from one- or two-member households are always 
upward sloping. Hence, these subgroups become ‘richer’ as θ  goes up. For all other subgroups, 
downward sloping lines imply that they become relatively ‘poorer’ as θ  goes up. According to our 
definition of ‘rich’ and ‘poor,’ A1C0-A1C3 subgroups are notably poor. Across all countries, 




percent) below the average when 6.0=θ  (=0.55) – irrespective of whether households are needs or 
size weighted.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Subgroups’ population and equivalent income ratios again determine the overall mean 
equivalent income ratio: mean equivalent income per one-member household divided by mean 














µµµµ , again as functions of θ . For all countries, the 
DEAHEIDOMHEI µµ -curve is downward-sloping for low values of θ , intersects the 1.0-threshold line 
from above at some medium level of θ , and then converges against the threshold line from below. 
This pattern is the aggregate outcome of the relationships presented in Figures 1 and 2. 

















































19 ,  
plotted against θ . For all countries, the DEAHEIiDOMHEIi ππ -curves are positively sloped for 
subgroups A1C0, A1C1 and A2C0, and negatively sloped else. As can be seen from equation (9), 
this pattern is caused by the interaction of the relationships presented in Figures 1 and 3. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
3.3 Sensitivity of inequality estimates 
3.3.1 Theil index 
Figure 5 presents our main results on the sensitivity of the Theil index. The upper left graph depicts 
the ratio DEAHEIDOMHEI TT plotted against admissible values of θ . In a predominant number of 
countries, DEAHEIT  exceeds DOMHEIT  and the ratio DEAHEIDOMHEI TT falls with θ . Only in Poland, 
Norway and Sweden and for high values of θ  , 1>DEAHEIDOMHEI TT . Relative differences between 
DOMHEIT  and DEAHEIT  can be substantial. For example, the index ratio is about 0.83 for 10.0=θ in 




02.1=DEAHEIDOMHEI TT  in Poland and 0.93 in Ireland for 60.0=θ . As we will show in Section 3.4, 
these cross-country differences are sufficiently large to affect country inequality rankings.  
 To understand the relationship presented in the upper right graph of Figure 5, we also depict 
the ratios of size- and needs-weighted within- and between-subgroup component ratios. The within-
subgroup component ratio, DEAHEITDOMHEIT WW ,, , is depicted in the lower left graph. Like the 
DEAHEIDOMHEI TT -ratio, the DEAHEITDOMHEIT WW ,, -ratio increases in θ , and is usually smaller than 
1.0. Compared to the DEAHEI, the population share of inequality-diminishing groups, therefore, 
must be higher in the DOMHEI. As size-weighting attaches larger weights to multi-member 
household units, equivalent-incomes of ‘large’ households should be distributed more equally. 
Indeed, subgroup-specific Theil indices – provided in Table 2 – give empirical support: Especially 
children tend to have an inequality-reducing effect. Only Poland, Norway and Sweden deviate from 
this empirical regularity. And, exactly in these three countries, the DEAHEITDOMHEIT WW ,, -ratio is 
non-increasing in θ .  
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 Finally, turning to the between-group component of the Theil index, the lower left graph of 
Figure 5 gives the , ,T DOMHEI T DEAHEIB B - ratio. For small values of θ , , ,T DOMHEI T DEAHEIB B is 
substantially smaller than 1.0. For example, across all countries, 74.0,, ≤DEAHEITDOMHEIT BB at 0=θ . 
The DEAHEITDOMHEIT BB ,, -ratio is s-shaped in θ  , crossing the 1.0-threshold line for medium levels 
of θ  (reaching a cross-country peak of 15.1≈  for 55.0=θ in Luxembourg), and then again 
converging to 1,, =DEAHEITDOMHEIT BB  for 0.1→θ . This relationship is due to mutually enforcing 
and mitigating effects resulting from the patterns depicted in Figures 1-4. 
 
3.3.2 Gini index 
Analogously to the Theil-index ratios presented in Figure 5, Gini-index ratios are plotted in Figure 
6. The graph top left gives the Gini-index ratio, DEAHEIDOMHEI GG ; up right depicts the between-
subgroup ratio, DEAHEIGDOMHEIG BB ,, ; down left the within-subgroup ratio, DEAHEIGDOMHEIG WW ,, ; 
down right the overlap-component ratios, DEAHEIDOMHEI OO . Several parallelisms to the results 
concerning the Theil index occur. First, with the only exception being Poland, DEAHEIG , like 




decreases (see upper left graph of Figure 6). The ratios DEAHEIDOMHEI TT  and DEAHEIDOMHEI GG  are 
even similarly sized. Second, the within- and the between subgroup ratios of the Theil and the Gini 
index change in a likewise manner: the increase of the within-subgroup component ratio in θ  (see 
graph bottom left) as well as the s-shape of the between-subgroup-component ratio (see graph up 
right) is reconfirmed.  
The within- and the between-component ratios for the two indices, however, differ slightly. 
For most countries and values of θ , DEAHEITDOMHEITDEAHEIGDOMHEIG WWWW ,,,, < and 
DEAHEITDOMHEITDEAHEIGDOMHEIG BBBB ,,,, < . This can be explained by the overlap-component ratio, 
DEAHEIDOMHEI OO , capturing some of the variation. Overlaps are sensitive to the transformation 
procedure as equivalent-income distributions’ overlaps of any two subgroups are weighted 
differently, by DOMHEIip  vs. 
DEAHEI
ip .  
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
 
3.4 Inequality parades 
Figure 7 illustrates the implications of size vs. needs weighting for cross-country comparisons of 
inequality. Two ‘inequality parades’ for each index are provided – one for the DOMHEI and one 
for the DEAHEI. Parades are obtained by sorting countries according to their index.9 The country 
with equivalent incomes being most equally distributed is assigned a ‘1,’ the country with the most 
unequal distribution a ‘20.’ The upper two graphs give country rankings by the Theil index, the 
graphs below by the Gini index. As demonstrated in previous literature (cf. for example Coulter et 
al. (1992), Burkhauser et al. (1996), Aaberge and Melby (1998), Duclos and Makdissi (2005)), 
rankings are sensitive to the chosen index and equivalence-scale elasticity. In addition, it turns out 
that the conversion method itself has an impact on the inequality parade. 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
 Let the sequence of ranks reported be , , ,DOMHEI DEAHEI DOMHEI DEAHEIT T G G⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . Then, taking 
Germany as an example, the numbers are [ ]7,8,8,9  when 4.0=θ , and [ ]6,7,9,10  when 2.0=θ ; 
[ ]10,10,9,8  and [ ]8,9,6, 4  in case of Switzerland. Size- and needs-weighted rankings, by 
                                                          
9 Such a ranking ignores the possibility that average equivalent-income levels differ across countries. So, a country – 




definition, coincide for 0.1=θ , Yet, in case of the Theil (Gini) index, rankings already become 
different for 95.0≤θ  ( 80.0<θ ). This is illustrated by Table 3, where the frequency and size of 
country re-rankings is summarized. Consider, for example the entry in column labeled ‘1’ (‘-2’) and 
row 25.0=θ  in case of the Theil index. Here we have a value of ‘4’ (‘2’). This entry means that 
four (two) countries ascend (descend) one rank (two ranks) in the parade when switching from a 
conversion by size to needs.10 The last column of Table 3 (‘Sum’) gives the sum of the following 
product: number of ascends times frequency of occurrence. This is an aggregate measure of the 
rankings’ sensitivity. For example, consider the entry in row ‘ 0.20, Gθ = .’ There we have the 
value 121225 =⋅+⋅  as five countries ascend two and two one rank. In case of the Theil index 
(Gini index), parades become more sensitive when θ  goes down as long as 25.0≥θ  ( 15.0≥θ ). A 
further lowering of θ  does not lead to a further increase of re-rankings. In sum, these results show 
that the conversion procedure has significant effects for cross-country inequality rankings for 
typical values of θ . 
 
4 Conclusion 
For 20 countries, we have presented inequality estimates for a size and a needs weighted quasi-
homogeneous equivalent-income distribution. The theoretical properties of both distributions have 
been explored in Ebert and Moyes (2003) and Shorrocks (2004). Our empirical examination reveals 
that country inequality rankings are conversion sensitive for equivalence scales implying 
reasonable within-household size economies. By means of a decomposition analysis, we have 
investigated the mechanisms and identified the key source that make needs and size weighted 
inequality estimates diverge. That inequality estimates are typically lower in the DOMHEI is driven 
by two effects: Higher weights of large household units in case of size weighting in combination 
with low income inequality among households with children.   
                                                          




Table 1a. Sample description and coverage by subgroups 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note. Disposable household incomes per month (weighted), PPP adjusted in USD. Ns are non-weighted numbers of observations. 
Coverage gives the percentage of the total weighted population that is covered by the respective household type. A denotes adult; C 




Table 1b. Sample description and coverage for whole sample 
Country 
Average 
income N Coverage 
Average 
 household size 
AT 2,386 1,959 89.67 2.11 
BE 2,386 1,886 94.2 2.11 
EE 693 4,943 89.38 2.16 
FI 2,002 9,410 95.19 2.01 
FR 2,257 9,338 91.87 2.21 
DE 1,118 10,037 94.19 1.91 
GR 1,619 3,081 81.38 2.39 
HU 733 1,643 84.29 2.21 
IE 2,256 1,851 83.03 2.37 
IT 2,082 6,334 82.8 2.32 
LU 3,578 2,174 90.33 2.23 
NO 2,635 11,279 94.43 1.99 
PL 838 23,728 78.15 2.51 
RU 379 2,465 79.99 2.28 
SI 1,244 2,566 75.02 2.46 
ES 2,057 3,760 78.93 2.37 
SE 1,937 13,450 95.95 1.89 
CH 3,113 3,358 93.25 2.14 
UK 2,575 23,209 92.03 2.16 
US 3,543 43,711 89.46 2.24 
Note. Average disposable household incomes per month (weighted) of the household types taken 
into account, PPP adjusted in USD. N is the non-weighted number of observations per country. 
Coverage gives the percentage of the total weighted population that is covered by the 9 
household types.  
 
Table 2. Theil coefficients by subgroups 
Country  A1C0     A1C1     A1C2    A1C3     A2C0     A2C1     A2C2     A2C3     A3C0     
AT 11.77 5.52 8.30 2.21 13.37 9.36 9.26 11.03 8.46 
BE 16.82 8.15 9.82 2.03 81.51 14.50 11.15 9.17 12.32 
EE 23.88 19.06 12.03 13.41 25.75 23.59 19.03 20.15 17.95 
FI 14.38 7.25 4.19 4.38 15.22 9.03 8.74 14.49 8.26 
FR 17.35 11.93 9.91 10.10 14.18 10.17 10.70 11.10 11.35 
DE 17.66 8.77 14.71 2.70 13.89 10.32 13.37 8.84 9.90 
GR 28.80 22.11 21.28 0.00 21.87 15.66 15.81 12.96 14.20 
HU 22.84 17.15 3.82 7.36 16.11 20.02 13.11 14.67 8.14 
IE 41.41 6.91 6.35 4.95 21.28 19.88 9.57 19.55 12.31 
IT 22.99 12.20 14.68 15.78 23.78 15.31 16.07 35.64 18.06 
LU 14.63 7.07 11.31 2.22 12.22 8.59 10.54 9.43 8.72 
NO 14.33 11.82 5.79 2.68 17.36 7.44 12.82 26.18 11.60 
PL 14.35 16.99 12.13 12.73 13.50 16.04 16.46 16.38 14.22 
RU 41.17 45.63 35.57 0.00 52.46 51.95 31.95 60.62 24.87 
SI 14.32 10.66 13.76 --- 14.00 8.96 8.15 7.15 10.58 
ES 27.61 14.69 22.06 20.92 23.35 16.38 19.60 35.24 15.44 
SE 13.01 9.54 5.62 4.28 10.36 8.85 19.25 10.44 5.97 
CH 22.32 5.59 12.37 4.97 15.90 22.71 9.52 11.18 14.40 
UK 32.85 10.06 9.36 6.06 22.60 16.25 23.69 19.90 15.79 
US 29.67 24.41 29.68 23.75 23.94 23.05 21.04 22.10 17.49 






Table 3.  Re-rankings 
Frequencies of re-rankings of specific 
magnitude θ  Index 
5 4 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 -4 
Sum 
    7 5 1   7 
0.00 T  G     3 3 3 3   9 
    7 5 1   7 
0.05 T  G   1  2 2 4 3   10 
    7 4  1  7 
0.1 T  G  1   2 1 3 2 1  10 
   1 3 3 1   5 
0.15 T  G    2 2 2 5 2 1  12 
   1 4 6    6 
0.2 T  G     5 2 4 2  1 12 
  1  4 3 2   7 
0.25 T  G     1 6 2 1  1 8 
  1  4 1 3   7 
0.3 T  G     1 5 3   1 7 
    5 3 1   5 
0.35 T  G     2 2 3  1  6 
    5 3 1   5 
0.4 T  G    1 2 2 3 3   9 
    7 3 2   7 
0.45 T  G    1 2 2 4 1 1  9 
   1 4 4 1   6 
0.5 T  G    1 2 1 2 3   8 
   2 1 1 2   5 
0.55 T  G    1  1 2 1   4 
   1 2  2   4 
0.6 T  G     1 1 1 1   3 
   1 2  2   4 
0.65 T  G     1 1 1 1   3 
    4  2   4 
0.7 T  G      2 2    2 
    3 1 1   3 
0.75 T  G      1 1    1 
    1 1    1 
0.8 T  G           0 
    1 1    1 
0.85 T  G           0 
    1 1    1 
0.9 T  G           0 
    1 1    1 
0.95 T  G           0 
Note. ‘Sum’ is a sum of five products. Each product is: magnitude of  
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Figure 4. Equivalent-income share ratios.
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Table A1. Data files 












Austriaa) AT at00h 13.7603 1 0.914 
Belgiuma) BE be00h 40.3399 1 0.921 
Estonia EE ee00h  1 7.045 
Finlanda) FI fi00h 5.94573 1 0.979 
Francea) FR fr00h 6.55957 1 0.915 
Germanya) DE de00h 1.95583 1 0.981 
Greecea) GR gr00h 339.170 1 0.684 
Hungary HU hu99h  1.053 107.337 
Irelanda) IE ie00h 0.78756 1 0.953 
Italya) IT it00h 1936.33 1 0.808 
Luxembourga) LU lu00h 40.3399 1 0.988 
Norway NO no00h  1 9.010 
Poland PL pl99h  1.026 1.820 
Russia RU ru00h  1 7.351 
Slovenia SI si99h  1.017 141.385 
Spaina) ES es00h 166.368 1 0.742 
Sweden SE se00h  1 9.190 
Switzerland CH ch00h  1 1.897 
United Kingdom UK uk99h  1.046 0.632 
United States US us00h  1 1.000 
Note. a) Countries where the PPP conversion factor is normalized with respect to the EUR. 
For all other countries, the PPP conversion factor refers to the country-specific currencies. 
 
Table A2. Gini coefficients by subgroups 
Country A1C0 A1C1 A1C2 A1C3 A2C0 A2C1 A2C2 A1C3 A3C0 
AT 26.43 18.31 21.33 11.09 27.84 22.37 22.99 24.75 23.00 
BE 27.46 21.11 23.82 10.93 44.30 24.52 25.00 22.46 24.96 
EE 35.84 32.60 26.89 29.2 36.12 35.56 34.06 33.82 32.41 
FI 26.49 20.47 15.87 14.57 25.56 20.95 20.08 24.04 21.19 
FR 30.91 26.65 24.05 23.83 28.54 24.53 24.96 24.76 25.77 
DE 30.83 23.15 29.53 12.91 27.80 24.55 24.12 22.68 22.77 
GR 40.06 36.25 38.04 0.00 35.50 31.37 30.88 28.41 29.13 
HU 32.20 32.35 18.11 36.43 29.04 33.87 28.28 26.25 22.51 
IE 42.68 20.62 19.37 14.08 35.19 31.77 23.56 31.71 27.22 
IT 34.52 26.35 27.84 28.70 34.47 29.70 30.43 39.86 31.92 
LU 27.96 21.68 25.90 11.23 27.17 23.21 25.15 24.10 23.31 
NO 27.49 21.92 17.25 11.98 26.21 19.18 20.89 25.49 20.91 
PL 27.50 30.86 26.87 25.73 27.07 30.11 30.05 30.23 28.46 
RU 41.92 50.81 46.34 0.00 44.65 50.19 43.87 57.23 36.86 
SI 29.24 24.64 30.72 --- 28.43 23.29 21.35 21.56 25.20 
ES 38.75 30.42 38.88 34.39 35.67 30.56 34.14 44.00 30.31 
SE 26.63 21.00 16.87 14.08 24.00 20.71 22.80 21.25 18.60 
CH 31.66 18.74 26.74 18.04 28.77 26.44 22.25 25.63 29.00 
UK 36.96 23.73 22.22 17.96 34.99 30.37 32.73 32.20 29.32 
US 40.57 35.83 39.18 35.78 36.44 34.94 33.54 34.55 31.48 
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